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trustworthy and be able to commu-
nicate, review, and debate the level
of trust achieved in them. In the
safety domain, explicit safety cases
are increasingly required by law,
regulations, and standards. (We de-
fine a safety case as “a documented
body of evidence that provides a
convincing and valid argument that
a system is adequately safe for a
given application in a given envi-
ronment.”1) Increasingly, regula-
tory agencies are making the case
for a goal-based approach, in which
claims (or goals) are made about the
system, and arguments and evi-
dence support those claims. This
approach1–3 goes back at least a
decade, and was heavily influenced
by Stephen Toulmin’s early work
and by the contemporary perspec-
tive of proof as a social process.4,5
The need to understand risks
isn’t just a safety issue: organizations
must know their risks and be able to
communicate and address them for
multiple stakeholders, from the
boardroom to the back office and
beyond. To address these additional
sources of risk, researchers are gener-
alizing the ideas behind the safety
case into the assurance case. An in-
ternational community has begun to
form around this issue and the chal-
lenge of moving from rhetoric to re-
ality. In this article, we outline what a
small, international group of ex-
perts, spanning various disciplines in
safety, security, reliability, and critical
infrastructure, has been doing with
the International Working Group
on Assurance Cases (for Security),
what we hope to achieve, and where
we go next.
The first step
One of the first public events this in-
ternational community organized
was a workshop entitled, “Assur-
ance Cases: Best Practices, Possible
Obstacles, and Future Opportuni-
ties,” which was part of the Interna-
tional Conference on Dependable
Systems and Networks held in Flo-
rence, Italy, June 2004. Chuck
Howell (MITRE), Shari Lawrence
Pfleeger (RAND Corp.), Victoria
Stavridou-Coleman (SRI Interna-
tional), and Sofia Guerra (Adelard)
organized the workshop to promote
communication among groups that
were working in the broad area of
assurance cases. These groups were
often unaware of what other, similar
groups were doing, so discussions
focused on the challenges and op-
portunities for assurance cases, with
the additional aim of initiating the
development of a standard set of best
practices and guidelines for devel-
oping and assessing assurance cases. 
Speakers came from Adelard, the
City University of London, MITRE,
Pfleeger Consulting Group, Praxis
Critical Systems, RAND Corp., SKI
(the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspec-
torate), SRI International, Carnegie
Mellon’s Software Engineering In-
stitute (SEI), and the University of
York. The full set of position papers
and presentations is available at
www.aitcnet.org/AssuranceCases/
agenda.html.
An important result of the
workshop was the decision to take
this work further in the security
area; accordingly, Robin Bloom-
field (City University London and
Adelard), O. Sami Saydjari (Cyber
Defense Agency), and Chuck We-
instock (SEI) organized a workshop
on assurance cases for security in
June 2005, which SEI hosted in
Washington, DC. Many of the
same individuals who participated




The follow-up workshop, called the
“Workshop on Assurance Cases for
Security,” brought together people
working on assuring safety, reliabil-
ity, and security to envision how as-
surance cases for security ought to
work and how the community
might pursue viable technical ap-
























ritical systems are aptly named—from electric
power to water and gas to the telephone system
and the Internet, they’re all critical to some aspect
of our daily lives. We’re a networked society and,
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international mix of security and
safety practitioners and researchers
from Adelard; Cyber Defense Agen-
cy; MITRE; SEI; the UK’s Defense
Science and Technology Laboratory
(DSTL); CERT; the University of
Missouri, Rolla; City University
(London); York University; Car-
negie Mellon; SKI; the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;
and the European Commission’s
Joint Research Center (JRC) repre-
sented the intersection of several
communities.
The workshop’s overall objective
was to assess how to develop assur-
ance cases for security and what
challenges such activities presented.
It produced the following outputs:
• a vision statement, including what
the workshop attendees hoped to
achieve with assurance cases and
what difference it would make if
we were wildly (or even moder-
ately) successful;
• a top-level decomposition of the
problems associated with develop-
ing assurance cases;
• a mapping of existing work to the
decomposition;
• a set of key hard problems and
promising approaches;
• a list of possible research sponsors
for assurance cases; and
• some worked examples. 
The workshop started with in-
troductory talks and discussions on
safety cases and security assurance,
followed by parallel sessions in
which three groups constructed
example fragments of assurance
cases for security (the previously
mentioned safety cases) based on a
common model. Ann Miller (Uni-
versity of Missouri, Rolla) offered a
three-layer model of a robot
manufacturing facility, with a su-
pervisory control and data acquisi-
tion (SCADA) layer and a
corporate intranet. The groups
used this model to explore the dif-
ferences between security and
safety cases, and to learn what
works and what doesn’t in a secu-
rity context.
The workshop’s overall aim was
to investigate possible answers to
some key issues: 
• Claims. Are there standard pat-
terns for claims about certain
kinds of properties or systems? Are
these claims sufficiently tangible
to be subjected to rigorous assur-
ance cases? How can organiza-
tions elicit appropriate claims
from stakeholders?
• Arguments. What makes an assur-
ance case “compelling”? Are there
standard patterns for arguments?
Do different audiences have differ-
ing criteria, and are some criteria
better than others? What argu-
ments should be compelling, and
what arguments do people actu-
ally find compelling? How do
additional arguments or evidence
increase a case’s compelling na-
ture? If accepted notions make a
case compelling, to what extent
do we know that these accepted
notions are correct?
• Evidence. What evidence is needed
to support an argument? What
new types of evidence are needed
to create more sound arguments?
By what metrics do we assess the
effectiveness of evidence?
• Justification. What is the cost–
benefit justification for developing
an assurance case? Are there differ-
ent levels of effort, depending on
motivation? Can we quantify
these levels? What short-term
benefits arise from assurance case
activity? Can we show that a well-
defined and executed assurance
case process will cost less than cur-
rent assurance processes?
• Maintenance. How are assurance
cases maintained as systems evolve?
• Composition. How can assurance
cases be composed?
A recent report (www.csr.city.ac.
uk/AssuranceCases) provides the
workshop’s technical output; it con-
centrates on the results of the three
breakout groups, which generated
very different and somewhat comple-
mentary results. The report’s con-
clusion section summarizes the
discussion on the way forward.
A key lesson from the workshop
was how the participants’ different
backgrounds and perspectives
proved to be mutually stimulating
and informative. The more safety-
oriented participants also recog-
nized that, even though many
technical issues must be addressed
and safety tools and notations can
be deployed on security, the un-
derlying methods still must be de-
veloped. The lessons learned and
issues raised include
• describing how hierarchical con-
ceptual decomposition puts secu-
rity requirements in context;
• acknowledging the need to ad-
dress all attributes, terminology,
and concept issues; 
• declaring “open season” on argu-
ments and leaving it to the users to
define them;
• determining the balance between
inductive and deductive techniques;
• discovering the role of models and
the relationships between them;
• examining how the results of vul-
nerability assessments and attack
trees fit into assurance cases;
• determining when to stop and
knowing when the case is complete;
• defining the role of standards; and
• learning how to deal with the
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need for both trusted and trust-
worthy cases.
The workshop concluded with the
determination to continue the series
into assurance cases for security. 
Trust and risk 
communication in
critical infrastructure
In March 2006, the series continued
with a workshop entitled, “Assurance
Cases for Security: Communicating
Risks in Infrastructures,” hosted by
the European Commission’s JRC in
Ispra, Italy, and organized by Marcelo
Masera. The event brought together
the core group who attended the pre-
vious workshops along with experts
in risk assessment and communica-
tion. Importantly, it included a practi-
tioner from a critical UK nuclear
infrastructure who was responsible
for justifying information and com-
munications technology (ICT) sys-
tem security. 
The important conclusion from
this workshop was the need to sup-
port the communication of risks
between stakeholders involved in
critical infrastructures; assurance
cases appear to be a workable solu-
tion. They can be applied to the
different types of objects that com-
pose an infrastructure, from prod-
ucts to processes to systems to
organizations. The assurance cases
for different types of objects might
exist for different objectives, take
different shapes, and obtain evi-
dence from very different sources,
but we believe it might be possible
to develop a common theoretical
and methodological support for all
assurance cases. 
Assurance cases can be moti-
vated by regulations (laws, stan-
dards, and codes of practice),
internal decisions made by owners
or producers, and bilateral agree-
ments (or contracts). This multiplic-
ity of objectives can affect the
negotiations and trade-offs in assur-
ance case claims—and, more im-
portant, to the interpretation of an
assurance case’s results.
Because critical infrastructures
and process control systems are dy-
namic with changes in configura-
tion caused by connectivity, software
updates, and other business issues,
their assurance cases are more
dynamic because they must be re-
viewed when new information
comes in about system vulnerabili-
ties or threats, or when the system’s
structure, functioning, or behavior
change. Consequently, the assurance
case’s validity is in constant flux. This
fact creates a specific dynamic in a
system’s evolution from trustworthy
to trusted.
The workshop also further de-
veloped some of the observations
from previous workshops, especially
about the need for argument com-
position to incorporate rationale
and evidence from different sources.
The multiplicity of stakeholders re-
quires us to manage different views
on an assurance case (for example,
specific claims and details in argu-
ments and evidence). In multiparty
settings, the assurance case plays a
key role in risk-related decision-
making processes, which might be
performed in very different styles
(such as adversarial or collaborative).
T hese various workshops haveidentified several technical, pol-
icy, and research challenges that pol-
icy makers, practitioners, and the
research community must solve; for-
tunately, we’re working collectively
and individually to address them. We
are currently developing more con-
sidered technical publications from
workshop reports and planning fur-
ther activities. If you’re interested in
collaborating or participating, please
contact Robin Bloomfield (reb@
csr.city.ac.uk). 
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